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Original Intent, History,
and Levy's Establishment
Clause
Ruti Teitel
W. LEVY, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment. New York: Macmillan, 1986. Pp. xvi + 236. $16.95.

LEONARD

When one of our leading constitutional historians takes on the doctrine of "original intent," there is reason for celebration, but also for
alarm. On the one hand, it is good to see some serious scholarship in an
area that has been marked by rhetoric. On the other, the very act of doing
historical work on the question tends to legitimate it. Worse yet, there is
the risk that incorrect conclusions will be drawn from the historical record
and that the nature of historical inquiry itself will be transformed by the
enterprise.
Leonard Levy's The Establishment Clause displays both the promise
and the problems of work of this type. The book offers important historical work on the religious practices in the states at the time of the Constitution's ratification, but the record Levy presents fails to support his
position in the original intent debate. This debate, which is really two
debates, questions whether the establishment clause should be interpreted
today as it was understood at the time of the founding; and if so, whether
the founders favored general, nondiscriminatory aid to religion. Without
expressly taking a stand on the first question, Levy answers the second by
arguing that nondiscriminatory aid for religion was not supported at the
time the Bill of Rights was enacted. Yet, by grounding his arguments for a
"no-aid" or separationist reading of the establishment clause on evidence
from the time of the framers, Levy by implication takes a pro-original inRuti Teitel is professor of law at New York Law School. J.D. 1980, Cornell Law
School.
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tent stand. Rather than quelling the original intent debate, Levy adds fuel
to the fire.
I begin this review by exploring the parameters of the original intent
debate. I show where Levy fits in as a historian and argue that historical
inquiry of the type used in The Establishment Clause does not provide the
certainty claimed by Levy and other advocates of the doctrine of original
intent. In part Ill, I compare Levy's conclusions with those of other religion clause historians and note their conflicting conclusions regarding the
interpretation of original sources. In part IV, I argue that the indeterminacy of historical interpretation limits the usefulness of original intent in
constitutional adjudication.
In part V, I identify a parallel problem for the historians of original
intent. Just as originalist constitutional lawyers have turned to history, so
the historians of original intent have turned to law for added understanding of the legal framework. I suggest some reasons for this development;
and I also indicate some of the problems which arise in the interaction of
the historical and legal frameworks. Constitutional adjudication asks a different question than does historical inquiry. Yet, the historical inquiry in
The Establishment Clause is cast in the terms of a current legal dispute. Be·
cause the adjudicative context transforms the historical understanding, the
historical understanding I argue cannot serve as an independent basis for
constitutional decisionmaking. This observation challenges the notion
that history can provide objective standards for interpretation of constitu·
tional text-the essential claim of those who focus on original intent.
In part VI, I contrast the original intent doctrine with the current
approach to history in church-state jurisprudence. I argue that the
Supreme Court has rejected original intent in favor of what I term "consti·
tutive" or "constitutional intent"-intent that has endured from the time
of the framers to the present. The Court looks to history to see what
traditions have been established. Tradition is the preeminent source for
the Court's understanding of the constitutive in contemporary church·
state relations.
Last, I critique the Court's "tradition" doctrine. In contrast to an
original intent approach to history, the Court's use of history allows some
departure from past understandings, but analysis of the case law shows
that the Court's adherence to community traditions in its interpretation of
the establishment clause ultimately cannot address the essential tension at
the core of the religion clauses: the conflict between government protec·
tion of the public good and the individual's pursuit of religious freedom.

I. THE ORIGINAL INTENT DEBATE
Levy opens by posing the question: Does government support for
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religion violate the "policy embodied in the establishment clause"? Levy
then posits that the answer to this question necessarily warrants an "examination of history." A historian by training, Levy understandably responds as a historian to the contemporary call for a return to original
intent. Thus, in The Establishment Clause, Levy attempts to provide a historical rebuttal to the claims of the original intent school; and it is Levy's
thesis that original intent opposes any form of government aid to religion,
whether or not that aid gives preference to one religion over another. But
The Establishment Clause ultimately fails to make the case that the answer to
Levy's question is discoverable in history.
Levy has become enmeshed in a national debate about constitutional
theory. At issue is whether broad constitutional provisions should be interpreted within the parameters of the text and the original intent of the
framers. Variously know as the "originalism" or "interpretivism" debate,
it is a debate over the proper sources for constitutional adjudication which
juxtaposes the interpretation of text, and authors' intent, with sources external to the constitutional text, such as precedent, community consensus,
or political theory.
The originalism debate represents the culmination of more than a
decade of challenges to Supreme Court decisions involving questionable
constitutional analysis. In 1954, Broum v. Board of Education, 1 with its reliance on social and cultural facts, suggested that the relevant constitutional
standards lay outside the Constitution and even the legal realm. In 1973,
the debate was refueled by Roe v. Wade. 2 Unlike prior cases which claimed
to be interpreting constitutional provisions and their "penumbras,"3 Roe
was overt in eschewing reliance on constitutional text. In 1985, the debate
was reopened by then Attorney General Edward Meese who, in a widely
publicized speech, accused the Supreme Court of "judicial tyranny," and
called for a return to a "jurisprudence of original intent."4
In The Establishment Clause, Levy identifies the originalism debate
with the new Right and the Reagan administration.5 But this characterization fails to adequately capture the dimensions of the public debate generated by Meese's comments. Within the legal and academic communities
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. Address of Edwin Meese Before the ABA Ouly 9, 1985), "The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution," Occasional Paper No. 2, Federalist Society, 1986; W.
Brennan, "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification" (Address to
Georgetown University, 12 Oct. 1985), 19 U.C. Dauis L Rev. 2 (1985); 27 S. Tex. L Rev. 433
(1986); see also J.P. Stevens, "Construing the Constitution" (Address to Federal Bar Association, 23 Oct. 1985), 19 U.C. Dauis L Rev. 15 (1985). See also J. P. Stevens, "The
Supreme Court of the United States: Reflections After a Summer Recess,'' 27 S. Tex. L
Rev. 447 (1986).
5. See also D. Laycock, "Constitutional Theory Matters," 65 Tex. L Rev 767, 76~9
( 1987) (referring to the debate over "Reaganite Constitutional Theory").
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the issue of constitutional interpretation and original intent became the
central debate of the 1980s.6
In the constitutional decisionmaking concerning religion, the
originalism debate has been at its most contentious. In the 1960s and
1970s, the Supreme Court invalidated government aid to religious schools,
as well as a variety of religious practices in the public schools. 7 Originalists
challenged the Court's interpretation in these cases, arguing that the original intent of the framers favored government aid to religion so long as it
was nonpreferential.8
Advocates for nonpreferential aid claim to have history "on their
side." And it is this assertion that history lines up on the side of the
proponents of aid to religion that animates Levy. In The Establishment
Clause, Levy sets out to reclaim for history what he asserts is its rightful
. home in the separationist camp. Yet, while The Establishment Clause sets
out to shake the alliance between those supporting nonpreferential government aid to religion and originalists asserting that this was the framers'
intent, to the extent that Levy also grounds his response in originalist history, he agrees more than he disagrees with his alleged opponents. As a
result, ~either side recognizes the complexity of the interaction between
history and today's church/state problems. Historical facts simply cannot
be marshalled to shore up one constitutional thesis or another. As Levy
shows but paradoxically does not recognize, the very framing of the constitutional question shapes the historical facts.
6. See, e.g., J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980): M. Perry, "The Authority of Text,
Tradition and Reason," 58 S. CaL L Re11. 551, 572-87 (1985); L Simon, "The Authority of
the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?" 73 Calif. L
Re11. 1482 (1985).
7. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
8. While the proponents of the original intent method of interpretation and of govern·
ment aid to religion overlap, they are not identical. Originalist proponents of government
support for religion include: W. Berns, The First Amendment and the Future of American Democracy (1976); G. Bradley, Church-State Relationships in America (1987); R. Cord, Separation
of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction (1982); M. Howe, The Garden and the
Wilderness (1965); M. Malbin, Religion and Politics: The Intentions of the Authors of the First
Amendment (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst. 1978) ("Malbin, Religion and Politics"); see also E. Corwin, "The Supreme Court As National School Board,'' Law & Con·
temp. Prob. 14 (1949); J. Antieau, L Downey, & C. Roberts, Freedom from Federal
Establishment: Formation and Early History of the First Amendment Religion Clauses (1964); J.
O'Neill, Religion and Education Under the Constitution (1949).
There are advocates of government aid for religion on nonoriginal intent grounds, as
well as originalists who oppose government aid. Leading advocates of separation of church
and state from an intentionalist perspective are L Levy, The Establishment Clause; D. Laycock, "Nonpreferential Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent,'' 27 Wm. &
Mary L Re11. 875 (1986); P. Kurland, "The Origins of the Religion Clauses,'' 27 Wm. &
Mary L Re11. 839 (1986). See also L Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom (1967) (replying to
originalist accommodationists), and T. Curry, The First Freedoms 83 (1986) ("Curry, First
Freedoms").
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II. METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES
A. Text Versus Intent
Without any discussion of methodology, Levy's inquiry into the
proper interpretation of the establishment clause adopts a strict intentionalist method. He launches into a review of a variety of sources of evidence
of original intent, but the consideration of constitutional text as one such
source is conspicuously absent (at xiv). Levy's choice of method is perhaps
consistent with his training as a historian. But as a matter of constitutional or even legal interpretation, choosing original intent over text
would seem to require some explanation, if only because the language of
the establishment clause is understandable without looking to the intentions behind its text. 9
In circumventing the text of the establishment clause, Levy misses the
fact that, as a product of the constitutional amendment process, the text
has authority over any other evidence of legislative intent. 10 It is the text,
not the intent underlying it, that was voted on, and that represents the
consensus of the full constitutional process. 11
One reason Levy avoids the text is that he regards the breadth of the
establishment clause language as vague and indeterminate, and thus not
useful as a sign of the framers' intentions. For Levy, text merely fixes a
time for determining a historical understanding {see at xiv). 12 Yet paradoxically, it is the breadth of the language which supports Levy's anti-aid
position. The text of the establishment clause is short and simple: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...." 13 A
plain reading of the text indicates that the bar is absolute; it does not
distinguish government support on the basis of religious preference.
In evading constitutional text, Levy misses other provisions regarding
religion which also support his argument. Article VI, at section 3, which
prohibits religious oaths as conditions for federal office, provides "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any office or Public
9. The strict intentionalist approach conflicts both with ordinary legislative interpreta·
tion method and, interestingly as a historical matter, with the approach to statutory inter·
pretation employed during the founding period, which looked first to objective evidence of
intention, and not legislative history. See J. Powell, "The Original Understanding of Origi·
nal Intent,'' 98 Harv. L Rev. 885 (1985).
10. See Ely, Democracy and Distrust 12, 16 (1980).
11. See F. Schauer, "An Essay on Constitutional Language,'' 29 U.C.LA L Rev. 797,
809 (1981). F. Easterbrook, "The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction," 11
Haro. J.L & Soc. Policy 59, 60 (1988).
12. "History suggests answers but the constitutional text does not" (at xvi). P. Brest,
"The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," 60 B.U.L Rev. 204, 209 n.28
(1980). Some commentators suggest that broad text provides the parameters for acceptable
interpretation. See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 398 (1986), and Schauer, 29 U.C.LA L Rev.
at 829-30.
13. U.S. Const. Amend. I, cl. 1.
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Trust under the United States." Like the establishment clause, Article VI
is absolutist. It bars all religious oaths-not merely those which are co-erced. Analyzed together, the no--oath clause of Article VI and the esta~
lishment clause of the First Amendment provide textual parameters
justifying a constitutional interpretation that would bar even nonpreferential governmental aid to religion. Understandably those arguing for such a
distinction must turn from text to other evidence of intent. But it also
follows that Levy and others advocating a reading of establishment which
does not distinguish on the basis of preference need not turn to original
intent, but may._ instead rely on textual analysis.

B. Founders' Intent and State Practice
Much of the discussion about the uses of history in constitutional
interpretation centers on questions of methodology and, in particular, on
sources. Is original intent to be found in the practices of the period, in its
legislative history, or in the statements of the framers? And with respect to
the latter, who are the framers? Are they the Constitution's debaters, its
ratifiers, or their constit:Uents?14
Levy focuses on state practice and simply assumes a connection between state customs and federal laws. In so doing, he triggers yet another
facet of the original intent debate. To rely on state practice as evidence of
original intent ignores the reality that the equation of federal and state
standards is a modern development attendant to the evolution of the incorporation doctrine, and was itself the subject of heated and prolonged
debate among intentionalists. 15
Based on the practices of the states at the time of the ratification of
the Bill of Rights, Levy asserts it is the intent of the establishment clause to
bar all aid to religion, including nonpreferential aid. By showing that
there were "multiple" establishments in those states that had established
religion by law, Levy argues that at that time "aid" was understood to
mean aid to more than one religion. Six states had establishment of reli14. See Brest, 60 B.U.L Rev. at 214, 220.
15. For an intentionalist historian's arguments against incorporation of state and federal constitutional standards see R. Berger, Government by Judiciary (1977); For an intention·
alist lawyer's argument against incorporation see E. Meese, "The Supreme Court of the
United States," 27 S. Tex. L Rev. 455 (1986). For historical sources supporting incorpora·
tion via the privileges and immunities clause, see Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2765-66 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Howard). See generally M. Curtis, No State Shall Abridge:
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (1986). See J. Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States (Rotunda & Nowak ed. 1986).
In addition to the intentionalist argument against incorporation is the current call for
"interpretive communities," which would also seem to argue against an automatic equation
of state and national understandings. See, e.g., M. Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue at 315-16
(1988).
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gion by law and of these, all six had multiple establishments; none had an
exclusive, single establishment. From this, Levy deduces that in these
states, "establishment" meant public support of religion on a "nonpreferential" basis and that these practices inform what we should understand
by "establishment" in the federal Constitution.
Levy's analysis involves several interpretive leaps. The first is the
premise that the Constitution was intended to regulate state practices.
The Establishment Clause provides no historical support on this critical
point. In fact, what evidence exists suggests the very opposite. The debates of several of the state constitutional conventions reflect an under·
standing that the constitutional definition of establishment was different
from that of the states. 16
The critical leap for Levy is his equation of "multiple establishments"
with "nonpreferential aid." In fact, the historical context suggests other·
wise; even at the time of the founders the multiple establishments were
clearly regarded as aid and simply represented a political compromise between factions divided over the question of established religion (at 26).
Consider the example of Massachusetts, where, as in a number of other
states in the Northeast, there was establishment by "local option." The
state constitution provided for a "town parish," which was an established
church in every town elected by majority rule. The local option plan also
contemplated compulsory tax contributions to the church of the tax·
payer's choice.
Although as a theoretical matter, the local option system allowed religious minorities "equal opportunity" to establish the church of their
choice, the system ultimately created a preferential establishment, as each
town in the state could officially recognize only one church (see at 44-46,
discussing Vermont).
Moreover, it was clear to the founders that the local option plans
discriminated along religious lines. In those states having local option
plans, there was continual conflict over which religious societies were eligi·
ble to receive taxes.17 Fl!rther, not all religions were equally situated for
the receipt of government benefits. For reasons of religious doctrine, Baptists and Quakers opposed compulsory contributions, yet were not exempted from the compulsory taxes. 18 These historical problems
16. See Levy at 33 (regarding the 1820 Convention to reconsider art. 3 of the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution). See also McDaniel v. Pacy, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978) (Brennan
J., concurring) (discussing the irrelevance of state practices to the federal understanding of
the establishment clause).
17. In Massachusetts, for example, there was a dispute between the rrinitarians and the
unitarians as to which was the "official" religious society and accordingly authorized to
receive the state disbursement of taxes.
.
18. In Connecticut, to be excused from taxes supporting the majoritarian Congregationalist establishment, the "dissenters," consisting of Baptists, Methodists and Episcopalians, were required to obtain a certificate showing membership in and tax
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undermine Levy's analogy of the plural establishments of religion in some
states to today's concept of nonpreferential aid to religion.
Notwithstanding the minimal historical support for his argument
against all government assistance, by focusing on state practices Levy
seems to get the upper hand of the historians' debate. In sharp contrast,
in critiquing the pro-aid position, levy adopts a strict intentionalist position, insisting on precise historical examples or language which would reflect the specific intent to allow nonpreferential aid to religion.
Levy asserts that the jurisprudence of "original intent" is an "in, vented" history, history manipulated for a purpose, to adjudicate contemporary church-state conflicts. Yet his historical account seems to suffer a
similar flaw. Rather than allowing the historical inquiry to shape his conclusions, levy imposes the contours of today's original intent debate on
the practices of the past.

III. THE IDSTORIANS' DEBATE
In The Establishment Clause, Levy sets out to respond to the Reagan
administration and its supporting historians 19 who argue that original intent conclusively favors some form of government sponsorship of religion.
Relying on state practice, as discussed above, levy claims in rebuttal that
the original evidence lines up conclusively against any form of aid to religion-even where it is nondiscriminatory. But the extreme positions
staked out by Levy do not fully describe the historians' debate over original intent.
One of Levy's students, Thomas Curry, disputes Levy's basic premise
that the multiple establishments were nonpreferential. 2° Curry contends
there is no historical evidence that the founders saw any distinction between aid to one church and aid to several. Whereas the rhetoric of the
period described establishment as aid to one church, the founders' practical experience concerned multiple establishments. In fact, Curry argues,
the New England constitutions that provided for multiple establishments
contributions to a recognized religious body. The certificate procedure marked one as a
"dissenter" and often resulted in social stigma. See E. Gaustad, The Emergence of Religious
Freedom, Religion and the State O. Wood ed. 1985). Also undermining the equation of the
multiple establishments with nonpreferential support was the existence in some state consti·
tutions of additional "nonpreference" clauses, e.g., Massachusetts and New Hampshire; if
you accept Levy's argument these would seem redundant (see p. 38). Levy also does not
explain North Virginia's constitution, which proscribes establishment and defines it as
unidenominational. These examples illustrate the problem with the term "nonpreferential
aid"; it assumes a consensus among religions on the valuation of government benefits. If
there was no consensus on this question two hundred years ago, today our greater religious
diversity makes it virtually unattainable.
19. See, e.g., Malbin, Religion and Politics (cited in note 8). R. Cord, Separation of
Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction (1982).
20. See Curry, First Freedoms at 210-11 (cited in note 8).
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were never intended to be examples of nonpreferential aid; instead they
were political compromises deliberately intended to limit the dominance of
the Congregational Church. 21 Curry's analysis of the ratification process
of the Constitution further threatens Levy's reliance on state practice.
Some of the ratification debates indicate that "church-state" relations
were in no way intended to define the relations between churches and the
federal government.
Beyond state practices, Curry examines other historical evidence such
as the debates on the Bill of Rights, and concludes that the founders' in·
tent concerning nonpreferential aid is inconclusive. Whereas Madison
and Jefferson opposed general assessments, other founders appear to have
advocated preferential government support.
Curry offers an alternative interpretation of the problem of govern·
ment aid to religion. At the time of the founders, he suggests, government
aid was not analyzed on the basis of preference at all, as it is today, but
instead on the basis of coercion. Of the 11 states ratifying the First
Amendment, Curry observes, 9 opposed mandatory government assist·
ance to religion through taxation but favored voluntary private support. 22
The historians' debate is complicated further by Douglas Laycock
who, in a recent article, "Nonpreferential Aid to Religion: A False Claim
About Original Intent, " 23 agrees with Levy that the founders recognized
distinctions between preferential and nonpreferential aid, and opposed
both. But Laycock disagrees with Levy and agrees with Curry on the relevance of state practice as historical support for this conclusion.
Unlike Levy, Laycock's conclusion that the framers opposed nonpreferential aid eschews evidence of state practices. For Laycock, constitu·
tional text and its legislative history are evidence of original intent
opposing general aid to religion. As to text, the broad language of the
establishment clause, its use of the term "establishment" rather than na·
tional church, and the general preposition "respecting" religion, rather
than "one" or "a," are indicia of the intent to bar all government support
to religion. 24
As to Levy's reliance on state practice, Laycock, like Curry, interprets
the multiple establishments to have been in no way nonpreferential. 25
Whereas Curry construes the multiple establishments as evidence that the
founders had no practical experience with nonpreferential aid, for Lay21. See id. (discussing general assessments).
22. See id. at 197-98.
23. See 27 Wm. & Mary L Reu. 875 (cited in note 8).
24. Id. at 910.
25. Laycock focuses on the local option system of establishment in Massachusetts,
which, although democratically elected, constituted an establishment of majority rule. As
concerns Levy's reliance on state practice, Laycock also observes that there are added feder·
alism problems.
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cock, it was precisely the day-to-day experience with the multiple establishments that enabled the founders to distinguish between preferential and
nonpreferential aid.

IV. THE HERMENEUTICS OF ORIGINAL INTENT
Together Levy and Curry provide ample evidence to refute the position of historians claiming that the founders supported nonpreferential
governmental aid to religion. Whether through Levy's unequivocal or
Curry's more equivocal position, one thing is clear: the waters have been
muddied, there is evidence on the other side.
But the Levy/Curry debate also illustrates the indeterminacy that lies
in historical interpretation and thus challenges the use of original intent in
constitutional interpretation. Levy encounters a basic problem in using
the original intent approach to respond to the question of the founders'
support of nonpreferential aid. There is simply no historical evidence of
the founders' opinion on nonpreferential aid. The issue did not exist at
the time. In the absence of such evidence, Levy turns to historical analogues. He takes the state practices at the time of the ratification regarding
multiple establishments and analogizes these to today's concept of nonpreferential aid. But his reliance on historical analogues threatens the very
search for certainty spurring his historical inquiry. Having turned to original intent to address the indeterminacy in constitutional interpretation of
the establishment clause, Levy is thereafter unable to confront the indeterminacy in his own historical interpretation.
The question Levy sets out to answer is, What did the framers intend
concerning nonpreferential government aid to religion? But Levy's question assumes that there is a specific intent about nondiscriminatory aid
which we can recover. We know the founders spoke and wrote about religion, particularly during the period of the ratification, and this raises a
presumption favoring the use of original intent in today's church-state
controversies.
But the differing views encompassed by the historians' debate indicate
there may not be a specific intent that can be recovered regarding our
present concept of nondiscriminatory aid. Curry maintains that at the
time of the founding the word "nonpreferential" had no meaning. Levy
appears to concede this in failing to proffer any evidence about the term
nonpreferential as such, and in relying instead on analogues to the state
multiple establishments.
Levy's inquiry is inextricably tied to the vocabulary of today's churchstate debate. 26 The interpretational problems he encounters are a result of
26. See M. Tushnet, "Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism
and Neutral Principles," 96 Haro. L Rev. 781, 793 (1983).
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the distance between the context of today's debate and the historical context of the period of the Constitution's adoption. 27 One way this distance
reveals itself is in changes in the language of the debate over time. 28
To the extent it is a contemporary debate which engenders Levy's
historical inquiry, The Establishment Clause reflects the "hermeneutic dilemma." In historical interpretation, it is the irresolvable problem of a
historian's inability to be simultaneously aware of both present and historical horizons. 29 To reconstruct the historical, Levy puts himself in the historical context. Yet even as he does so, he loses the frame of reference of
today's church-state controversies.30 The hermeneutic problem is an inexorable obstacle in the search for a certain historical understanding of original intent. 31 When the original intent inquiry is itself characterized by
uncertainty, it cannot lay claim to curing the indeterminacy of constitutional interpretation. Original intent simply does not decide the case. It
cannot provide the answers claimed by Levy and other intentionalists to
contemporary constitutional church-state conflicts, such as the issue of
nonpreferential government aid to religion.
That history does not provide a certain answer on the meaning of
establishment of religion should not have come as a surprise. Since the
late 19th century, historians have confronted the elusiveness of objective
knowability in historical interpretation.32 In light of the longstanding debates within the American historical profession concerning the problem of
standards of understanding in history and, by contrast, our comparatively
recent discussions about indeterminacy in legal interpretation, that intentionalists from within the legal profession could have carefully nurtured
the belief that the standards for "objective" interpretation would derive
from history reflects a deliberate circumvention of a century of historical
writing on standards of historical knowability that poses a serious challenge to the law's use of history in its pursuit of truth.

V. LAW AND HISTORY AND HISTORY AND LAW
A. Uncertainty in Law and History: The Russian Doll
Problem
Part IV above discusses one hermeneutic problem in Levy's approach
27. See Brest, 60 B.U.L Rev. at 219 n.52 (cited in note 12).
28. See Schauer, 29 U.C.LA L Rev. 831 (cited in note 11).
29. See H. G. Gadamer, The Principle of Effective History: The Hermeneutic Reader 270
(K. Mueller-Vollmer ed. 1988).
30. Gadamer notes the very idea of the hermeneutical "situation" means "we are in
the midst of it" and, therefore, are unable to have any "objective knowledge of it." Id.
31. See id. at 270.
32. See Kloppenberg, "Objectivity and Historicism: A Century of American Historical
Writing," 94 Am. Hist. Rev. 1011, 1012 (1989).
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to original intent: the problem of time, of the unknowability today of the
historical tradition as it was. But there is another hermeneutic issue.
Levy's problem in interpreting historical evidence of the founding is affected by the judicial context of his inquiry. Not only is he going back into
history to answer today's disputes, but he is framing the questions as they
are framed by a particular group of lawyers.
Adjudicative context also poses further interpretational problems.
When judges and lawyers look to history, the adjudicative context affects
their historical interpretation. So, for example, Levy's Establishment Clause
responds to a contemporary question about nonpreferential aid-as it is
framed in contemporary constitutional caselaw. It is the current constitutional disputes that define Levy's historical inquiry, and therefore th~re is
a clear circularity implicit in his reliance on original intent evidence to
resolve these constitutional disputes. This circularity frustrates attainment
of any independent objective meaning in constitutional interpretation on
the basis of history.
Rather than helping to resolve the uncertainty in constitutional interpretation, the historical inquiry only compounds the uncertainty. Like
nesting Russian dolls, the problems of interpretation do not disappear but
become more manifold.

B. History and Law
The interdisciplinary inquiry has not been a one-way street. Just as
lawyers have turned to history to resolve issues of constitutional doubt, so,
too, intentionalist historians such as Levy, Cord, and Malbin have turned
to law, and taken their debate on original intent to the legal framework for
their own purposes, for elucidation of their historical conclusions. 33 As
discussed above, the historians' interpretation of original intent is shaped
by the context of constitutional adjudication. And it is the adjudicative
framework that is increasingly sought out by intentionalist historians.
Levy's coming to the law is symptomatic of a growing intervention by
historians in the legal process. This has taken different forms in recent
years. Historians have increasingly participated in the legal process as expert witnesses. Commentators from within the legal community appear to
consider this development to be motivated largely by lawyers and their
clients. Yet as is reflected in the historians' debate over original intent, in
fact the legal process is increasingly being sought out by historians, as expert witnesses, as amicus curiae, and as commentators on caselaw, concern-

33. Another example from outside of the church-state dispute is Raoul Berger; see Government by Judiciary (1977).
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ing issues of interpretation in constitutional adjudication, 34 but also in
other areas of public debate, among them civil rights35 and women's
history. 36
The turn to the law follows a current trend among historians toward
the social sciences for methodology which might enable study on a smaller
scale.31 The adjudicative framework provides historians with a case
method for testing a historical theory, for instance, about the meaning of
the establishment clause. The application of a historical theory to a particular set of facts in the legal context provides the parameters within which a·
theory can be verified-in a limited context-but perhaps at an attendant
higher standard of knowability.38
In addition to providing another methodology, the adjudicative
framework-in particular, constitutional adjudication-affords historians
an opportunity to participate in current events. Law enables applied history; through their involvement in caselaw, historians can connect the past
to the present. And insofar as. adjudication implies judgment, and a
"right" answer, it allows historians to take a stand on political questions. 39
Paradoxically in the legal community, the risks of historian intervention in the legal process have been discussed without any mention of the
attraction of legal methodology. 40 By contrast, constitutional scholars
have long touted the use of history in constitutional interpretation without addressing the problems of historical interpretation.

VI. ORIGINAL INTENT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTENT, AND THE SUPREME COURT
A. Original Intent and Constitutional Intent
The discussion in parts IV and V of the hermeneutical problems in
34. In other church-state debates, e.g., over creationism in the public schools; see Bolton, "The Historian as Expert Witness: Creationism in Arkansas," 4 Pub. Hist. 59-68
(1982).
35. See P. McCrarn & ]. G. Hebert, "Keeping the Courts Honest: The Role of Historians as Expert Witnesses in Southern Voting Rights Cases," 16 S.U.L Rev. 101 (1989).
See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
36. See T. Haskell & L Levinson, "Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case," 66 Tex. L Rev. 1629 (1988); "Women's History Goes on Trial,"
2 Signs 757 (1986).
37. See M. Kammen, Selvages and Biases: The Fabric of History in American Culture 51
(1987).
38. Compare legal fact-finding standards, e.g., preponderance of the evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt, with historical fact-finding standards. See Jacques Barzun & H. F.
Braff, The Modem Researcher (1985); R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (1976).
39. See, e.g., "Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on Objectivity in Scholarship and Expert Witnessing," 6 Public Hist. 5, 7 (1984).
40. See, e.g., Haskell & Levinson, 66 Tex. L Rev. 1629.
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the use of original intent history in constitutional adjudication uncovers a
fundamental conflict between the theory of original intent and hermeneutical methods of historical interpretation. Under the theory of original
intent, history is said to be relevant because it is asserted to be continuous
with the present. Like originalism, a hermeneutic approach traces areas of
continuity between the time of the founding and today; but by contrast, a
hermeneutical analysis also tries to understand the founding in its historical context, even while it distinguishes changed circumstances and
discontinuities.
The Levy-Curry-Laycock debate discussed in part II, I believe, reflects
areas of discontinuity between original and contemporary understandings
of church-state relations. But my perception of discontinuities itself raises
questions about historical interpretation. As The ~lishment Clause illustrates, ambiguous original history seen from the perspective of a contemporary debate can be misread as continuous with contemporary practices.
The remaining question is how to respond to the central intentionalist claim that history is only relevant where it is continuous with contemporary practices. In America, where our church-state relations are
distinguished by issues of diversity and pluralism, the consensus of a religious community eludes us. But this seeming difficulty appears to have
only heightened the allure of original intent. Even as our community
grows more fractious, the call for original intent grows more insistent.
While it is an apparent paradox, I maintain that the call for original intent
represents a search for national roots, for a "sharable past" or "constitutive history," a history that can do the difficult work of cohering our community today.
The Supreme Court has also joined in the pursuit of a constitutive
history, but without adopting an original intent approach. In its churchstate jurisprudence the Court has looked to evolving history, rather than
original history, and thus it has been able to neatly sidestep the hermeneutic problems presented by original intent, as well as the wearying debate
over its use.
Unlike intentionalism, which arrogates automatic relevance to original history, the Court's historical analysis traces the evolution of our constitutional understandings over time. In its interpretation of the religion
clauses, the Court studies the development of original understandings
from the founding through to contemporary times to determine whether
the original understanding of a protected religious liberty or a prohibited
establishment continues. Where there is continuity, original intent guides
the Court, but only because it has acquired the legitimacy of constitutive
intent. Pursuant to this historical inquiry, however, the Court also recognizes discontinuities between today's practices and those of the founding
period. By exposing discontinuities where they exist, the Court creates a

Establishment Clause 605

relegable past-distinguishable from a sharable history-those understandings which have become entrenched over time and represent enduring traditions for today's community.

B. Tradition and the Case Law
Inquiry into longstanding history or "tradition" is the Supreme
Court's fundamental standard in the jurisprudence of the religion
clauses.41 In Everson v. Board of Education, its very first case under the establishment clause concerning state aid to parochial schools, the Court
declared its interpretation of the establishment clause would be one which
accords with history. 42 "History" for the Court was not confined to original history but rather spanned our entire national history. Rather than
beginning its analysis with the history of the founding, the Court began
much earlier with English history.43 It traced the concern with tax support
for churches through to the colonial period and the founding. 44 Government financing of religious institutions, the Court observed, was the central concern animating the enactment of the religion clauses.
The Court's linkage of prerevolutionary English history to the colonial understanding of establishing is not an obvious connection. The English history of establishment, a product of a monarchical government, was
arguably different from the American system of popularly and democratically elected establishments. But the Court asserted that they raised similar concerns about the relations between church and state. By joining the
longstanding objections to tax-subsidized clergy to the newer interest in
aid to sectarian schools, the Court was able to create a continuous history
opposing subsidies to sectarian schools.
The Court has used a similar approach to history in evaluating the
constitutionality of nonfinancial governmental sponsorship of religious
practices. In Engel v. Vitale, its first consideration of prayers in the public
schools, the Court traced the history of government-sponsored prayer
from the English period through to colonial and contemporary history.
Throughout the years, the Court observed, there has been continuous opposition to government-sponsored prayer. Given this history, the Court
41. See R. Teitel, "The Supreme Court's 1984--85 Church-State Decisions: Judicial
Paths of Least Resistance," 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L L Rev. 651, 667-69 (1986); see, e.g., Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-55 (1984).
42. 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1946). Interestingly in Everson the dissent also would claim the au·
thority of history. See id. at 33 (Rutledge, J. dissenting) ("No provision of the Constitution
is more closely tied ••. to its generating history"). But see id. at 28 CTackson, J., dissenting)
("I cannot read the history of the struggle to separate political from ecclesiastical affairs
without a conviction that the Court today is unconsciously giving the clock's hands a backward turn").
43. Id. at 8.
44. Id. at 9-13.
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concluded that school prayer, like government-sponsored prayer generally,
poses an unconstitutional establishment.45
Just as it has invoked history to recognize longstanding establishments, so, too, the Court has invoked tradition in sanctioning government
support for religion. In Marsh v. Chambers, a legislative chaplaincy was
upheld as an "uninterrupted" practice with origins predating the Constitution.46 In Walz v. Tax Commission, tax exemptions for churches were
allowed because the exemptions were longstanding and accordingly considered to indicate "the national attitude" toward the question of whether
freedom from taxation constituted the affirmative government support
barred by the establishment clause.47 The Walz Court's deference to the
tradition of church exemption was tantamount to an argument for a constitutional statute of limitations.48
The tradition and the original intent approaches part company where
there is discontinuity between the original and the contemporary perceptions of a practice. In these instances, the Supreme Court has not deferred to original intent but has instead traced the evolution and change of
the tradition. In McGowan v. Maryland, a challenge to the state blue laws,
the Court traced the history of such laws, observing: "there is no dispute
that the original laws which dealt with Sunday labor were motivated by
religious forces" 49 to mark the Christian day of rest. But the Court went
on to reject the conclusion that "the State cannot prescribe Sunday as a
day of rest for these purposes solely because centuries ago such laws had
their genesis in religion." 50 According to the Court, since the blue laws
have continued in force for secular reasons, Sunday is no longer of a "reli45. 370 U.S. 421, 424-29, 436 (1962). Efforts to pomay public school prayer as a
tradition overriding the longstanding opposition to government-sponsored prayer have
been rejected by several Justices as historically wrong in light of the public schools' relatively
recent development. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 80 (105 S. Ct. at 2503) (O'Connor
J., concurring) & 105 S. Ct. at 2494 n.4 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring); Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 234-35, 239 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-35 (1962).
As in Everson, the dissent in Engel would also rely on history. "What New York does
with this prayer is to break with that tradition." Engel at 444 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Tradi·
tion was the Court's exclusive form of analysis supporting the legislative chaplaincy in
Marsh v. Chambers, 436 U.S. 783 (1983).
46. 436 U.S. 783 (1983). The practice had in fact been interrupted by President Jeffer·
son. See J. Fleet, "Madison's Detached Memoranda," 3 Wm. & Mary Q. 534, 562 (3d ser.
1946).
47. 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
48. Id. at 678: "It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right
in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire
national existence and indeed predates it. Yet an unbroken practice of according the ex·
emption to churches openly and by affirmative state action, not covertly or by state inac·
tion, is not something to be lightly cast aside. 'If a thing has been practiced for two hundred
years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to
affect it.'"
49. 366 U.S. 420, 431 (1961). See id. at 433-34, 440.
50. Id. at 445.
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gious character," and accordingly state sponsorship of the holiday in contemporary times passes establishment clause scrutiny.51
In McDaniel v. Pat::;, the Court employed a similar historical approach
to the constitutionality of laws disqualifying ministers from public office.52
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion reviewed the history of the disqualification laws. While recognizing that at the time of the founding these
laws were intended to buttress the separation of church and state, the
Court observed the fears of clergy in public office have diminished with
their involvement in public life over time. With the original establishment
basis for the clergy disqualification laws relegated to the past, now these
were regarded as clear infringements on religious liberty.
History plays a similar role in the Court's adjudication of free exercise
claims. Where the Court finds a longstanding religious mandate, such as
Sabbath observance, it is more likely to accommodate the practice.53
Where there is not a clear founders' intent, such as concerning practices in
the relatively modern public schools, at least Justice O'Connor has indicated she will not be bound by historical analogues. Nevertheless, with the
tradition test now an established element in the jurisprudence of the religion clauses, it has became standard constitutional litigation strategy to
cast religious practices which are contemporary as traditional. 54 Taking
their cue from the Court, plaintiffs now must undertake to couch their
claims to religious liberty in an entrenching history. In this way, the enduring tradition test posits a heavy burden on the newer religions, as well
as invites deliberate distortions of history.

VII. BRIDGES TO A SHARABLE PAST
The tradition test, unlike originalism, is a dynamic approach to history in that it appears to allow a reconstitution of the American people as
we change. But the tradition test also raises serious questions about the
role of longstanding consensus in constitutional interpretation.
The tradition test is an entirely different response to the question
which underlies the original intent debate about how the meaning of certain constitutional rights should be determined.
Intent analysis is premised on a settled debate. For the advocates of
original intent, the meaning of establishment of religion is fixed at the
51. Id. at 444; see id. at 507 (Frankfurter,]., concurring) ("The spirit of any people
expresses in goodly measure the heritage which links it to its past").
52. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
53. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1968).
54. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 667, 674 (1984). But cf. Id. at 715-18 (Brennan,
}., dissenting) (This case raises interesting questions about what constitutes a "tradition" in
a relatively young country: Does a 40-year-old practice of displaying a Christmas nativity
scene constitute a tradition?).
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time of the founding and by the founders. By contrast, in looking to traditions or understandings over the generations, the Court has rejected a
static determination of meaning at a particular moment in the past. The
tradition test has allowed the Court to tell and retell a story without a
fixed beginning or end. The Court's historical method has provided an
evolving narrative of American religious traditions. Under the tradition
test, the Court reviews practices over time and restates its interpretations
as perceptions change.
To some extent the Court's tradition test in its church-state jurispru·
dence follows its general usage of history in constitutional jurisprudence.55
History is seen as the backdrop for law. Legal terms acquire meaning as
informed by longstanding societal understandings. 56
The tradition inquiry's use of history is also true to the founders'
political theory. The founders were concerned not merely with creating a
democracy but with creating one which would last. To that end, the foun·
ders sought to identify national interests of some permanence.5 7 In looking for traditions in its religion clause jurisprudence, the Court has
attempted to identify precisely such enduring understandings. 56
While in theory the tradition test appears to allow a flexible analysis,
even under this approach to history the process of constitutional interpretation becomes imbued with a sense of inexorability. As historiographer
of our religious heritage, the Court's declarations of tradition strive to be
constitutive. The history must always come out right. 59
Through the tradition inquiry in its religion clause jurisprudence the
Court essentially endorses those understandings it deems to represent con·
sensus over time. The Court has defined our national religious heritage,
characterizing Americans as "a religious people"; 60 it has sustained prayers
in the state and federal legislatures,61 government-sponsored Christmas
displays, 62 and Sunday as an official holiday. 63 Under this test, in contrast,
55. See 0. W. Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 Harv. L Rev. 457, 472 (1897)
("Everywhere the basis of principle is tradition"); compare Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952) (Frankfurter J., op.) (history of executive practices as gloss on the textual terms).
56. See R. Gordon, "Historicism in Legal Scholarship," 90 Yale LJ. 1017 (1981). For
promoters among legal historians of a traditions approach to history in our jurisprudence
see W. Nelson & ]. P. Reid, The Literature of American Legal History 197 (1985).
57. See, e.g., The Federalist Papers No. 10 (Madison).
58. The Supreme Court's use of historical evidence of longstanding traditions in its
church-state jurisprudence comports with at least one historian's view of what the founders
comprehended by the term constitution: constitutive or shared understandings, which were
entrenched independent of a document. See S. Sherry, "The Founders' Unwritten Constitution," 54 U. Chi. L Rev. 1127, 1130 (1987).
59. See M. Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness 3-31 (1965). Compare K. Popper, The
Poverty of Historicism (1957).
60. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (Douglas, J.).
61. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
62. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
63. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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minority religious practices which are relative newcomers to the American
scene have not fared well. For example, a government-sponsored Nativity
scene display has been upheld, but not one which was clearly Catholic.64
Exemptions from government regulations for Sunday Sabbath observance
have been granted, but not comparable accommodations for Jewish Sa~
batarians. Amish school children have been excused from mandatory at·
tendance requirements but not Evangelical school children.65
To the extent that the Court's tradition inquiry simply legitimates
longstanding practices, it becomes a virtual proxy for the endorsement of
majoritarian understandings and raises serious questions about the role of
judicial review in the religion area.
Of greater concern is the fact that the tradition test does more than
simply reflect the result of the political process; it provides a constitutional
majority over time, that is, simple majorities compounded over the years.
This results in interpretation which is even more conventional than that
of a transient political consensus. Accordingly, the Court's conversion of
the longstanding majority religion's understandings to the "traditional"and ergo the constitutionally permissible-threatens the very values the
establishment clause, interpreted at any level of generality, was intended to
insure, the protection from governmental or majoritarian identification
with religion.
More chronicler than prophet, the Supreme Court in the religion
area has chosen tradition. Eschewing the pressing and grave problems of
religious diversity, of difference, of majority/minority relations, which
might point away from the protection of the structures and conventions of
the past, the Court has aspired solely to continuity, to constitution over
the years. 66

64. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, with Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct.
3086 (1989).
65. Compare McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (sustaining Sunday blue
laws) with Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking Sabbath Observer Law).
Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 225-227, 229 (1972) (Amish employment of
children on the farm "is an ancient tradition"), with recent evangelical cases, see, e.g., MO'
zart v. Hawkins, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
66. In assuming the role of consolidator of our traditions, the Supreme Court has
elected to forgo the prophetic role urged on it by several commentators. See, e.g., M. Perry,
The Constitution, the Court and Human Rights 98-99, 101-14 (1982). See also R. Cover,
"Bringing the Messiah Through the Law: A Case Study," Nomos XXX: Religion, Morality
and the Law 202 O. Pennock &J. Chapman ed. 1988). As a metaphor for law, Cover writes
of a "bridge" which "connects the present" with the future "world we can imagine"; compare this vision with the law in the religion area oriented backward toward bridging the
present to the past.

